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LaDouceur: Tort Law: Florida's Liability "Airbag" for Automobile Owners

TORT LAW: FLORIDA'S LIABILITY "AIRBAG"
FOR AUTOMOBILE OWNERS
Hertz Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1993)
Todd LaDouceur
Respondent, a minor boy, suffered injuries when an automobile,
owned by petitioner, ran a red light and knocked him from his bicycle.!
The driver of the automobile was an alleged participant in a plan to defraud petitioner and steal the vehicle.2 Two months before the accident,
petitioner entered into a car rental agreement with a woman and a man.3
The woman presented a VISA credit card for payment and signed a twoday rental agreement as the principal driver.4 The rental agreement listed

the man as an additional authorized operator.s Petitioner ran a credit
check on the woman's VISA card, received a positive response, and released the automobile to the couple.6 Twelve days later, police informed
petitioner that the woman had paid with a stolen VISA card, thus renting
the vehicle fraudulently.7 After complying with all statutory requirements
for classifying a rental vehicle as stolen,8 petitioner reported the theft to
police.9 Eleven days after petitioner reported its vehicle stolen, respondent

was hit by petitioner's automobile."0
Respondent sued petitioner under a theory of negligent entrustment."

1. Jackson v. Hertz Corp., 590 So. 2d 929, 935 (3d DCA 1991) (en banc) (Ferguson, J., dissenting), rev'd, 617 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 1993).
2. Hertz Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So. 2d 1051, 1052 (Fla. 1993).
3. Id.
4. Id. The woman purported to be Linda Major, and used a VISA credit card issued in this
name. Id. The male companion was Lawrence King. Id. Petitioner entered Mr. King's driver's license
number, its expiration date, and its issuing state on the rental agreement. Id. Petitioner did not enter
any of the woman's driver's license information on the rental agreement. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. A few days after petitioner rented the automobile, the real Linda Major reported the theft
of her VISA card to the Metro Dade Police and accused her neighbor of the crime. Jackson, 590 So.
2d at 935 (Ferguson, J., dissenting). The neighbor, Christopher Harris, was driving petitioner's automobile when it ran the red light and injured respondent. Id.
8. Hertz Corp., 617 So. 2d at 1052. "The Metro Dade Police Department Auto Theft Division
requires that rental car companies send a certified letter to the renter of each vehicle before any vehicle can be reported as stolen." Id. at 1052 n.1 (quoting Jackson, 590 So. 2d at 930 n.1).
9. Petitioner sent certified letters to both renters demanding the return of the automobile. Id. The
post office returned all certified letters to petitioner as undeliverable. Id. Upon return of the undeliverable letters, petitioner reported the automobile as stolen to the police. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. Respondent claimed that petitioner was liable "because its employees had negligently
entrusted the car to a person who (1) did not present a valid driver's license; (2) obtained the vehicle
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The jury became deadlocked on the issue of liability, so the trial judge
directed a verdict for petitioner." The original panel of the district court
affirmed the trial court's decision. 3 The panel concluded that petitioner
was not liable under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine because
"a species of conversion or theft had occurred.1 14 On rehearing en banc, a
split district court reversed the original panel and found petitioner liable-as a matter of law-under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine. 5 The district court also certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court of whether fraud affected the liability of an automobile rental
company under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. 6 The Florida Supreme Court quashed the decision of the district court" and HELD, once
an automobile has been converted or the subject of theft, the owner's initial consent is vitiated and the owner is therefore no longer subject to the
strict
vicarious liability that the dangerous instrumentality doctrine impos8
es.'
Florida is the only jurisdiction that imposes strict vicarious liability
upon the owner of an automobile under the common law dangerous instrumentality doctrine. 9 Most states have instead chosen legislative enactments to define the scope of liability of automobile owners.2 " Florida's
doctrine imposes strict vicarious liability upon an automobile owner who
voluntarily entrusts that automobile to another for any subsequent negligent operation which results in injuries to third parties.2' While this definition of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine claims to impose true
strict liability, it still requires negligence by the automobile driver.2 This

by fraud, and (3) negligently operated the vehicle causing the accident." Jackson, 590 So. 2d at 931.
12. Hertz Corp., 617 So. 2d at 1052.
13. Id. The Third District Court of Appeal of Florida considered this case twice. See id. The
initial panel also held that petitioner did not negligently entrust the automobile, nor delay in attempting
to regain possession of the automobile. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1051. The district court also certified questions to the Florida Supreme Court as to
whether the rental company's liability under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine was affected by either the renter greatly exceeding the rental period, or by the rental company's efforts to recover the
vehicle after learning of a fraudulent rental. Id.
17. Id. at 1054.
18. Id. at 1053-54.
19. Id. at 1053.
20. Many states have statutes imposing strict vicarious liability on automobile owners. See, e.g.,
GA. CODE ANN. § 40-9-102 (1994); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 257.401 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 485.186 (Michie 1993); A. Eugene Carpenter, Jr., The Dangerous Instrumentality Doctrine:
Unique Automobile Law in Florida,5 U. FLA. L. REv. 412, 413 (1952).
21. Jackson, 590 So. 2d at 937; see also Lynch v. Walker, 31 So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1947); Leonard v. Susco Car Rental Sys., 103 So. 2d 243, 244 & n.3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958) (quoting Lynch, 31 So.
2d at 271).
22. Hertz Corp., 617 So. 2d at 1053; Susco Car Rental Sys. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832, 836
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requirement is not a part of the general common law principle 3 and thus,
Florida courts' use of the term is a misnomer.24 However mislabeled, the
use of this doctrine, with its unique meaning, has a long and prominent

history in Florida.'
The Florida Supreme Court extended the common law dangerous
instrumentality doctrine to include automobiles in Southern Cotton Oil Co.
v. Anderson.2 In Southern Cotton, an employee of petitioner negligently
operated petitioner's automobile and injured a motorcyclist.' Because
petitioner conceded that the negligence of its employee caused the injuries
to the motorcyclist, petitioner's liability was the sole issue before the
court. 2' By characterizing an automobile as a dangerous instrumentality
under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, and utilizing principles of
respondeat superior, the court found petitioner liable.29

(Fla. 1959); Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629, 636 (Fla. 1920); see also Carpenter, supra note 20, at 414.
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1976). The general common law principle, as
stated by the American Law Institute, is that
(I) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to liability for harm to
the person, land or chattels of another resulting from the activity, although he has exercised
the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of which makes the
activity abnormally dangerous.
Id. The American Law Institute provides the following factors to be considered in determining whether
an activity qualifies for this strict liability:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.
Id. § 520. Previously, the American Law Institute articulated the principle as:
[O]ne who carries on an ultrahazardous activity is liable to another whose person, land or
chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage
of the activity for harm resulting thereto from that which makes the activity ultrahazardous,
although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 519 (1938).
24. See Carpenter, supra note 20, at 414.
25. Id.
26. 86 So. 629 (Fla. 1920).
27. Id. at 637 (Ellis, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 631.
29. Id. at 635-36. The Florida Supreme Court, in the concluding paragraphs of the majority opinion, relied on the language used in the notions of respondeatsuperiorand dangerous instrumentality to
impose liability. See id. at 636. This confusing language left some doubt as to whether the "new"
doctrine applied only to the employer-employee relationship, or instead extended to any consensual
situation. Carpenter, supra note 20, at 415. In dissent, however, Justice Ellis pointed out potential
problems with requiring that the employee's actions be within the scope of employment which the
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Relying heavily on statistical data which indicated that automobiles
were at least as dangerous as locomotives, the Southern Cotton court
reasoned that automobiles should be subject to the same type of liability
as trains.3" Acknowledging Florida's divergence with the majority view
on the dangerous nature of automobiles, the court stated that "[w]e are not
unmindful that a goodly number of courts lay down a different rule, but
their conclusions are not persuasive, because they ignore the dangerous
character of the automobile."3 1 The court noted that while a locomotive
in a roundhouse or an automobile in a garage is as harmless as a "canary
bird[]," each is a dangerous instrumentality in operation. 2 Applying this
unique version of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, the Southern
Cotton court concluded that because petitioner consented to its employee's
use of the automobile, a dangerous instrumentality, it was liable for the
injuries to the motorcyclist.33
Thirty-nine years later, the Florida Supreme Court broadened an automobile owner's liability under this doctrine in Susco Car Rental System v.
Leonard.34 In Susco, an individual rented an automobile from petitioner.3" The rental agreement stipulated that, without express consent, petitioner authorized no one other than the signed renter to operate the vehicle.36 Petitioner also orally informed the renter that this provision was a
condition for insurance.37 The day after the renter signed this agreement,
someone other than the renter drove petitioner's automobile negligently
and collided with another vehicle.38
The issue before the Susco court was whether the rental agreement
clause prohibiting additional drivers relieved petitioner of liability under
the dangerous instrumentality doctrine." The court held it did not.' As
majority never addressed. See Southern Cotton, 86 So. at 637-38 (Ellis, J., dissenting). This argument
suggests that respondeat superior was not the basis for the ruling. Regardless, subsequent decisions
have held that Florida's doctrine includes any consensual situation. See, e.g., Susco, 112 So. 2d at 836.
30. Southern Cotton, 86 So. at 631-32.
31. Id. at 633.
32. Id. at 632.
33. Id. at 636.
34. 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla. 1959). Prior to this decision, the Florida Supreme Court found commercial owners liable for the negligent operation of their automobiles by bailees. Lynch v. Walker, 31
So. 2d 268, 271 (Fla. 1947). Commercial owner liability was based upon Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine, and not respondeatsuperior. See id. Additionally, the supreme court found liability
where a person borrows an automobile but is merely a passenger and does not operate it. Carter v.
Baby Dy-Dee Serv., 31 So. 2d 400, 401 (Fla. 1947). All of these previous decisions rested heavily on
the initial consent of the owner, either express or implied. Leonard v. Susco Car Rental Sys., 103 So.
2d 243, 245 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958).
35. Susco, 112 So. 2d at 834.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 834-36.
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a result, automobile rental companies were liable for the negligent operation of their vehicles by persons other than the renter despite rental agreements expressly prohibiting such operation.41
Reiterating the justification for Florida's dangerous instrumentality
doctrine enunciated in Southern Cotton,42 the Susco court reasoned that
current statistical data on the dangerousness of automobiles validated the
doctrine.43 The court found that even though petitioner did not actually
"consent" to the negligent driver's operation of its vehicle, the petitioner
did "intrust[] that automobile to the renter for all ordinary purposes."'
The court held that allowing others to operate the rented vehicle was an
ordinary purpose of the rental.45 Further, the court concluded that the restrictions in the rental agreement did not negate petitioner's "consent."'
Finally, the court observed that "only a breach of custody amounting to a
species of conversion or theft will relieve an owner of responsibility for its
use or misuse. '
Seven years later, the Florida First District Court of Appeal further)
enlarged the notion of "consent" in Tillman Chevrolet Co. v. Moore.' In
Tillman, petitioner allowed an individual to "test drive" one of its automobiles.49 Petitioner limited its consent to allowing the individual to
drive the automobile to a local hotel to show it to his wife." After allowing the individual to take the vehicle, petitioner became suspicious and
called the police51 The police informed petitioner that the individual was
wanted by the Highway Patrol. 52 The Sheriff's office then sent out a
pick-up order for him.53
Sometime after leaving the dealership, the individual changed the
license plates on petitioner's automobile.54 Several days and several hundred miles later, the individual picked up a hitchhiker and asked him to
drive the automobile.5 The hitchhiker was driving when petitioner's au-

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 837.
See id.
86 So. at 636.
Susco, 112 So. 2d at 837.

44. Id. at 835.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See id.
Id.
Id. at 836.
175 So. 2d 794, 795 (1st DCA 1965), cert. discharged, 184 So. 2d 175, 175 (Fla. 1966).

49. Id. at 795.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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tomobile negligently collided with respondent's vehicle, causing injuries."
At issue in Tillman was whether Florida's dangerous instrumentality
doctrine imposed liability on petitioner even when the driver of
petitioner's automobile had exceeded petitioner's initial consent to a degree amounting to theft. 7 The First District Court of Appeal of Florida
noted that petitioner consented to the operation of the vehicle by the individual who, in turn, consented to the hitchhiker's operation of the vehicle. 8 The cburt held petitioner vicariously liable because his consent to
the operation of the vehicle was never negated. 9
The Tillman court reasoned that a causal relationship existed between
the petitioner and the injuries inflicted by the hitchhiker.' As a result of
this nexus, the subsequent theft and the hitchhiker's negligent operation of
petitioner's automobile did not exceed petitioner's initial consent.' Accordingly, the court ruled that Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine
mandated petitioner's liability because the subsequent criminal theft of the
automobile did not sever the chain of causation.62 In addition, Florida's
Third District Court of Appeal adhered to the Tillman reasoning until the
instant case.63

56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 796.
59. See id.
60. Id. at 795.
61. Id.
62. Id. The court relied on the initial consent of petitioner to distinguish this case from others in
which the owner or lessee of the vehicle was not held liable. Id. at 796 (distinguishing Bryant v. Atlantic Car Rental, 127 So. 2d 910, 911 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961) and Lingefelt v. Hanner, 125 So. 2d 325,
327 (Fla. 3d DCA 1960)). The Maryland case of American Home Assurance Co. v. Erie Ins. Exch.,
248 A.2d 887 (Md. 1969), decided close to the same time as Tillman, demonstrates a narrower definition of consent. In American Home, a private automobile owner gave a neighbor permission to use
the vehicle to get the neighbor's family from the neighbor's in-laws' home. Id. at 890. The owner
expressly stipulated that the neighbor go directly to the in-law's home and come straight back to the
apartment complex, where both the neighbor and owner lived. Id. The neighbor deviated from this
condition by stopping at a restaurant. Id. While at the restaurant, the neighbor met a friend whom he
agreed to take home before continuing on to his in-law's home. Id. The friend's home was not en
route to the neighbor's in-law's home and an accident occurred while en route to the friend's home.
Id. Appellant, who insured owner's automobile, brought a declaratory judgment action to determine
whether, under the terms of the omnibus clause of the automobile liability policy, it was obliged to defend the neighbor driver in the lawsuit arising out of the accident. Id. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of appellant. Id. The court of appeals affirmed. Id. The court of appeals reasoned that
because the owner's condition on the neighbor to not vary from his route was not met, the neighbor's
operation of the automobile was not within the owner's scope of granted permission. Id. Hence, the
court of appeals held that appellant was not compelled to defend the neighbor in the lawsuit. Id. at
888.
63. See, e.g., National Car Rental Sys. v. Bostic, 423 So. 2d 915, 917 (3d DCA), rev. denied, 436
So. 2d 99 (Fla. 1983). In Bostic, the Florida Third District Court of Appeal cited Tillman with approv-
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In 1991, however, the Florida Supreme Court in Stupak v. Winter Park
6 intimated in dicta that the conversion
Leasing,"
or theft of an automobile
might relieve the owner of liability for injuries to third parties." In
Stupak, an automobile passenger suffered injuries in an accident in which
the defendant's automobile was negligently operated by a renter.' The
defendant leased the automobile to a car rental agency. 7 The car rental
agency, in turn, rented the automobile to the renter. The renter used the
automobile, but did not return it to the car rental agency when it was
due.69 The accident that injured the passenger occurred after the automobile was due back to the car rental agency, and thus after the expiration of
the rental agreement."
At issue was whether the defendant lessor was liable to the passenger
for his injuries.7 The trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant and the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed without discussion,
relying on a decision that was subsequently quashed by the Florida Supreme Court.72 Because of the appellate court's reliance on an erroneous
decision,7 the Florida Supreme Court quashed the decision and remanded
the case 4
The defendant argued, however, that the appellate court granted summary judgment because the renter's use of the defendant's automobile
beyond the expiration date of the rental agreement constituted a theft or
conversion of the automobile. In dicta, the Florida Supreme Court stated that the defendant had no proof of this claim, but that the potential
theft or conversion was a genuine issue of material fact.76 Quoting
Susco,T' the court suggested that the misuse of the automobile might re-

al. Id. Additionally,

in the instant case, Judge Ferguson's dissent from the first appellate decision and
the en bane decision of the Third District Court of Appeal both cite to Tillman as controlling authority.

Jackson, 590 So. 2d at 935-37, 939 (Ferguson, J., dissenting).
64. 585 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1991).
65. Id. at 284.

66. Id.
67. Id. The automobile was leased under a master agreement which covered a number of vehicles. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. The Fifth District Court of Appeal relied on Kraemer v. General Motors Acceptance
Corp., 556 So. 2d 431 (2d DCA 1989), vacated by 572 So. 2d 1363 (1990), affd, 613 So. 2d 483 (2d
DCA 1992), cert. denied, 624 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 1993).
73. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
74. Stupak, 585 So. 2d at 285.
75. Id. at 284.
76. Id.
77. Id. (quoting Susco, 112 So. 2d at 832).
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lieve the defendant of liability under Florida's dangerous instrumentality
doctrine." This was the first suggestion that the Susco dictum, and not
the Tillman reasoning, might be the proper standard for analysis.
Not until the Florida Supreme Court's decision in the instant case was
there clearly a new standard of analysis.79 In rejecting outright the reasoning in Tillman, the instant court held that liability under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine should not depend solely on whether there
was initial consent by the owner to use the automobile." Consequently,
the instant court overruled the twenty-seven year old Tillman decision."
The court relied upon the observation in Susco that an owner avoids liability if a conversion or theft of the vehicle precedes the negligent operation." Applying this standard, the instant court noted that the couple never returned the automobile to petitioner, petitioner properly reported the
automobile stolen, and petitioner attempted to recover the automobile."
Finally, the instant court observed that the accident in question occurred
over two months after the actual two-day rental.84 Thus, the instant court
concluded that a conversion or theft occurred before the accident." Because of this conversion, the instant court held that no liability rested with
petitioner.86 With this holding, the instant court established an exception
to Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine for automobile owners who
initially consent to the use of their vehicles."
While the instant case dealt specifically with a commercial owner, the
78. Id. at 284.
79. See Hertz Corp., 617 So. 2d at 1053.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1054.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See id. The court also aligned Florida with other states not imposing this type of liability.
See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 788 P.2d 340 (N.M. 1990). In Allstate, a private owner's automobile crashed into a police blockade following a high-speed chase, injuring a police officer. Id. at
340-41. The driver, who obtained the owner's initial consent to use the vehicle, instigated the highspeed police chase. Id. Appellee, the owner's insurance company, brought a declaratory judgment
action to determine its obligation to defend the driver under the omnibus or permissive driver clause of
the owner's automobile insurance policy. Id. at 340. The district court entered summary judgment,
ruling that appellee had no duty to defend the driver. Id. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed,
and concluded that under the applicable New Mexico statute the "initial permission" rule governed the
issue of whether the owner had granted permission or consent to use the automobile within the meaning of the insurance policy's omnibus coverage clause. Id. at 344. Applying this rule, the court reasoned that the owner's automobile insurance did not extend to persons who had the wrongful intent to
deprive the owner of the automobile. Id. at 344-45. The court observed that such intent may be shown
by the intentional destruction of the vehicle, or a state of mind which evidences an utter disregard for
the return of the vehicle or its safekeeping. Id. at 345. The court then held that the omnibus coverage
clause did not cover the driver and that appellee was not liable. Id. at 340, 345.
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instant court noted that Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine has
always applied to both commercial and private automobile owners."8
Thus, the instant case conversion exception applies to all automobile owners. 9 By returning to a confined concept of consent, the instant court
halted a seventy-three year trend toward imposing true strict vicarious
liability upon automobile owners.
This trend toward stricter liability began when courts started expanding the definition of consent laid out in Southern Cotton." Susco expanded the interpretation of consent granted by automobile owners to renting
individuals under a strained theory of foreseeability. 9" With reasoning
amounting to fiat, the Susco court concluded that once an automobile
owner gave consent to a known renter, the owner was liable for the negligent operation of that vehicle by all unknown drivers.92 This liability
even extended to situations where the rental agreement expressly prohibited other drivers.93 This result altered the Southern Cotton doctrine, pushing it closer to strict liability.
Tillman imposed automobile owner liability even where there were
"outrageous deviations" from the scope of consent.94 The TilIman decision demonstrates how the district court in the instant case easily found
petitioner liable. In Tillman, the court held the automobile owner liable for
respondent's injuries despite the fact that the driver involved in the accident went to prison for stealing the automobile.95 The same situation arguably existed in the instant case.
Although the Tillman court applied Florida's dangerous instrumentality
doctrine, the analysis is more lucid if viewed as employing a strict liability
theory. Although the court required some negligence on the part of the
driver, this requirement is generally met in automobile accidents. Thus,
Tillman essentially moved Florida's doctrine to de facto strict liability.96

88. Hertz Corp., 617 So. 2d at 1053.
89. See id.
90. See Susco, 112 So. 2d at 835 (holding automobile rental companies liable for the negligent
operation of their vehicles by persons other than the renter, even when the rental agreement expressly
prohibited such operation); Southern Cotton, 86 So. at 636 (establishing in Florida the doctrine that
automobiles are dangerous instrumentalities requiring strict vicarious liability); Tillman, 175 So. 2d at
795 (holding that the subsequent theft and negligent operation by someone other than that person who
received the owner's consent did not absolve the owner from liability under Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine).
91. See Susco, 112 So. 2d at 835-36.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 836.
94. Jackson, 590 So. 2d at 937.
95. Tillman, 175 So. 2d at 795-96.
96. For an ironic prediction of how far Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine would eventually reach, see Carpenter, supra note 20, at 412-21. The author suggests that "[i]t is difficult to
imagine that the [c]ourt would go so far as to impose liability upon the bailor for all the possible
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Consequently, automobile owners became insurers of any misuse of their
vehicles by practically anyone.97 As the high water mark of liability under this doctrine, Tillman remained good law for twenty-seven years.9"
The Florida Supreme Court alluded to a possible new standard in
Stupak,9 but Stupak was equivocal on whether a "new" standard should
be used."° The Third District Court of Appeal's analysis in the instant
case illustrates that the conversion or theft discussion in Stupak was dicta*. ' Although recognizing a potential conflict between its decision and
Stupak, the Third District nonetheless applied the Tillman reasoning." 2
Thus, not until the instant decision was the new standard clearly imposed
by the Florida Supreme Court.
By overruling Tillman and elucidating Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine, the instant court provided clear guidance to lower courts.
As evidenced by the conflicting decisions reached before and after rehearing by the district court of appeal in the instant case," 3 this guidance
was long overdue. By identifying its decision as consistent with Susco,"
the instant court glossed over the confusion in lower courts. Florida courts
had long regarded the conversion exception from Susco as dictum. 5 The
Susco court itself referred to this theory as an "observation."'" The discussion of conversion or theft in Stupak was also treated as dictum. 7
The Susco conversion or theft theory lacked validity in light of the
Tillman ruling that subsequent theft of an owner's vehicle did not vitiate
consent.10 8 Thus, the instant court was disingenuous in stating that its
opinion was merely "consistent"'" with the previous Susco and Stupak
holdings. Despite the instant court's casual treatment of precedent cas-

misuses which a bailee might make of the car." Id. at 421. The Tillman court arguably went further
than the author's imagination. However, the author's subsequent statement clearly rings true following
the instant case. The author opined that the Florida Supreme Court "might, for example, relieve the
bailor of liability only when there had been a violation of reasonable restrictions so gross as to approach a conversion, so that the bailor was no longer the owner and hence no longer liable." Id.
97. See Tillman, 175 So. 2d at 796.
98. Hertz Corp., 617 So. 2d at 1053.
99. See Stupak, 585 So. 2d at 284.
100. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
101. Jackson, 590 So. 2d at 938 n.2.
102. Id.
103. Hertz Corp., 617 So. 2d at 1052-53. Compare supra note 15 and accompanying text with
supra note 16 and accompanying text.
104. Hertz Corp., 617 So. 2d at 1053.
105. Jackson, 590 So. 2d at 940.
106. Susco, 112 So. 2d at 835.
107. See text accompanying supra notes 75-78.
108. Tillman, 175 So. 2d at 795.
109. Hertz Corp., 617 So. 2d at 1053.
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es,"' it did redefine consent under Florida's dangerous instrumentality
doctrine."' The instant court effectively narrowed the scope of Florida's
dangerous instrumentality doctrine by raising the Susco and Stupak dictum
to a rule of law."'
The instant case presented a lose-lose situation. Applying the Tillman
de facto strict liability approach would require petitioner, who was also a
victim, to compensate respondent."' Conversely, overruling Florida's
doctrine completely presented a multitude of judicial ramifications and
questions. Complete overruling would have presented problems with both
stare decisis and the proper replacement doctrine. As a result, the instant
court needed to find some middle ground.
Negating initial owner consent through fraudulent procurement, subsequent conversion, or theft of an automobile is a rational and workable
concept. Without consent from the automobile owner, Florida's dangerous
instrumentality doctrine is inapplicable." 4 The instant court found a way
to except automobile owners from liability when fraud or theft is present
without dismantling the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. Moreover, the
instant court returned the scope of consent to a reasonable limit. This
exception should preclude revisiting the confusion faced by the district
court in the instant case. It also will preclude automobile owners from
being liable for damages stemming from criminals who steal their vehicles
and negligently injure others."'
There were two victims in the instant case: the respondent and the
petitioner. The same criminals wrongly injured respondent and left petitioner with a damaged vehicle and an unpaid account." 6 These criminals
should be held accountable. Unfortunately, criminals rarely possess the
resources to pay for the damage they cause. Admittedly, this may have an
adverse impact on a plaintiff's ability to recover damages. But, should a
court allow recovery from automobile owners in all circumstances, however attenuated? The Florida Supreme Court answered "no."".7
The instant case made Florida's rigid dangerous instrumentality doctrine more flexible. The doctrine, as supported by Tillman, was too extensive and imposed liability in situations involving outrageous deviations" 8

110. See id.
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
114. Hertz Corp., 617 So. 2d at 1053.
115. Id. at 1054. Petitioner was not held liable for respondent's injuries caused by its fraudulently
rented and subsequently stolen automobile. Id.
116. Id. at 1052.
117. Id. at 1054.
118. Jackson, 590 So. 2d at 937.
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from the consent given by automobile owners. When theft, fraud, or conversion exists, some relief from the strict imposition of Florida's doctrine
is in order. Because the automobile owner is a victim as well in such
instances, this is an area where liability seems inequitable and possibly
punitive. The Florida Supreme Court rightly viewed automobile owners as
victims in the instant case"' and enunciated a compromise limitation to
the dangerous instrumentality doctrine which is both fair and equitable.

119. Hertz Corp., 617 So. 2d at 1054. While not expressly characterizing petitioner as a victim,
the instant court recognized that the renters had stolen petitioner's automobile. Id.
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